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The Accounting Standards Exec­
utive Committee (AcSEC) of the 
American Institute of Certified Pub­
lic Accountants (AICPA) recently 
issued the Report of the Task Force 
on Disclosure of Insurance. Accord­
ing to the issues paper initially pre­
sented to AcSEC by the task force, 
disclosure of insurance coverage 
should be required; according to the 
final report, disclosure is “encour­
aged, but not required” [Task Force, 
p. 2, 1987]. Before examining the 
report of the task force and other 
relevant accounting pronounce­
ments, the circumstances that led to 
the issue of insurance coverage dis­
closure will be discussed.
Liability Insurance Crisis
Liability insurance is currently at 
a crisis level in the United States. 
For many companies, availability of 
insurance is limited. For other com­
panies, coverage has been reduced 
and/or restricted. Some insurance, 
such as pollution liability, is almost 
nonexistent. The liability coverage 
that is available is so expensive that 
many companies cannot afford it. 
Premium increases have ranged 
from 50% to 1,000% in some cases 
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FMC Corporation had premium in­
creases of 350% in 1985 for less than 
one-half the coverage received in 
1984. This costly coverage was what 
was found to be the best available 
following FMC’s search for alterna­
tives in the worldwide insurance 
market [Malott, p. 10, 1986].
Companies and consumers alike 
find themselves involved in the lia­
bility insurance crisis. Companies 
pay through increased premiums 
and increased exposure to risks. Con­
sumers pay through increased prod­
uct costs and through reduced avail­
ability of desired products and ser­
vices.
Factors Contributing to the Cri­
sis. Insurance price wars throughout 
the late 1970s and early 1980s, the 
litigious attitude of many people, the 
United States tort system, the con­
tingency fee system, escalating judg­
ments and the general broadening of 
the scope and definition of liability 
by the courts are all factors which 
have contributed to the crisis in the 
liability insurance industry.
Many insurance companies had 
excess capital in the late 1970s. These 
excess funds often led to premium 
price cutting in order to increase 
market shares [Sinnott, p. 56, 1987]. 
High prevailing interest rates also 
contributed to decisions involving 
price cutting. Insurance companies 
expected to pay claims out of the 
high interest earnings, but interest 
rates started to decline while claims 
escalated. Property and casualty in­
surance companies lost $2.9 billion 
in 1984, $5.5 billion in 1985, and an 
estimated $22 billion in 1986 [Far­
rell, p. 88, 1986; Sinnott, p. 57, 1987]. 
The industry is projected to lose $62 
billion in commercial liability in the 
next five years [Hackenburg, p. 3, 
1987].
The litigious mindset of the Amer­
ican public is also partially respon­
sible for the insurance crisis. In 1984, 
16.6 million private civil suits were 
tried in federal courts. This repre­
sented an average of one civil lawsuit 
filed for every 15 Americans [Col­
lins, p. 57, 1985].
The tort system frequently allows 
individuals to sue for trivial matters. 
Suits are brought even when the vic­
tim sometimes shares the fault. Too, 
the legal system awards damages 
not only for economic loss but for 
pain and suffering as well. Punitive 
damages may also increase the 
award. The tort system judgments 
have reached a point that Lloyd’s of 
London has indicated that it might 
withdraw from the U.S. market if 
tort law reforms are not passed 
[Malott, p. 10, 1986].
Liability insurance is 
currently at a crisis 
level in the 
United States.
Most states have adopted some 
type of tort reforms, such as limiting 
the damages awarded and/or mak­
ing liability several but not joint. 
Also, Congress is giving considera­
tion to at least ten tort reform bills. 
The purpose of many of these bills is 
to provide uniform product liability 
among the States. Placing limits on 
economic and noneconomic loss 
awards, reducing lawyer contin­
gency fees, making liability several 
but not joint, setting statutes of lim­
itation, and providing guidelines for 
settlement are some of the ways the
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various bills address tort reform. 
These changes will reduce the right 
and/or incentive to sue but will not 
totally solve the insurance problem.
The contingency fee system for 
determining lawyers’ fees is also an 
important factor in the insurance 
crisis. This practice lessens plain­
tiffs’ financial risks and possibly en­
courages even more suits since 
awards often reach a million dollars 
or more and attorney fees are based 
on percentages of the judgments.
Escalating judgments by juries 
are also partly to blame for the insur­
ance crisis. According to the Jury 
Verdict Research Institute, multi­
million dollar claims increased from 
25 in 1975 to 450 in 1985 [Gahin, p. 
48, 1987]. For example, Ford Motor 
Company had projected death bene­
fits to be $200,000 per accident in 
lawsuits related to the Pinto auto­
mobile. Awards were so much higher 
(one as high as $12 million — later 
reduced to $6.7 million) that Ford 
was forced to recall the Pinto [Far­
rell, p. 89, 1986]. An article pub­
lished in Business Week reported 
similar costly judgments: “A. H. 
Robins Co. filed for Chapter 11 pro­
tection after paying out $530 million 
to settle 9,500 claims against its Dal­
kon Shield intrauterine device, with 
6,000 claims still pending. Union 
Carbide Corporation faces billions of 
dollars in suits for the toxic-gas leaks 
at its plant in Bhopal, India” [Far­
rell, p. 89, 1986].
The broadening definition and 
scope of liability as interpreted by 
the courts is another reason for the 
insurance crisis. The application of 
joint and several liability, as well as 
strict liability for products, has ex­
panded the scope of liability. Also, 
the courts often have provided lib­
eral interpretations of policy terms 
that favor the policyholder.
These factors have made it diffi­
cult for insurers to estimate losses 
and set premiums. As a result, rates 
have been increased, liability limits 
have been lowered, coverage has been 
reduced, claims-made policies are 
replacingoccurrence policies, and in 
some cases, insurance companies are 
going out of business.
Current Practices
Businesses today are absorbing 
and financing more risks than ever 
before because of the lack of afford­
able and/or available liability insur­
ance. Companies that cannot afford 
the high premiums are being forced 
to turn to claims-made policies, some 
form of self-insurance and risk man­
agement, or captive insurance com­
panies.
Claims-Made Policies. Tradition­
ally, insurance policies have been 
“occurrence” policies. An occurrence 
policy covers liability for any claims 
that take place during the time that 
the policy is in effect, regardless of 
when the claim is made. The insur­
er’s obligation is indefinite.
The litigious mindset 
of the American 
public is also 
partially responsible 
for the insurance 
crisis.
By contrast, “claims-made” poli­
cies cover only liabilities for claims 
that occur and are filed during a 
policy year. There is no coverage for 
a claim filed after the policy period. 
Because of the typical delay in mak­
ing claims, a company could find 
itself without coverage if it changes 
insurers or if insurance is canceled 
from year to year. For protection 
against claims that might be 
brought in the future, a company 
must buy additional “tail coverage” 
insurance which costs about three 
times as much as a claims-made pol­
icy [Brown, p. 60, 1986]. Included in 
a claims-made policy is a general 
aggregate limitation on claims under 
the policy.
A liability policy usually has two 
limits: (1) a maximum amount that 
the insurer will pay for a single 
occurrence and (2) a total amount 
that the insurer will pay for all 
occurrences in one year. A claims-
made policy has an aggregate limit 
on claims for all coverage under the 
policy. Under this kind of policy, one 
accident claim brought under a sec­
tion of the policy could be large 
enough to exhaust the aggregate lim­
it, leaving the company uninsured 
for the rest of the year. Drug, chemi­
cal, and heavy manufacturing firms 
— firms with long tail exposure for 
settling claims and large settlements 
— are targets for the new claims- 
made policies.
Self-Insurance. As an alternative 
to purchasing claims-made policies, 
many companies are becoming self­
insured. Some companies retain all 
of the risks; others self-insure for 
frequent, predictable losses and pur­
chase insurance for catastrophic 
losses.
Basically, a self-insured company 
views the payment of claims as the 
same as paying insurance premiums. 
Richard M. Page, chairman and chief 
executive officer of insurance broker 
Fred S. James & Co., projects that 
“by 1989 at least a third — and 
maybe as much as a half — of the 
commercial insurance market could 
be covered by self-insurance and cap­
tives” [Business Week, p. 112, 1986].
The problem with self-insurance 
is that the company may underesti­
mate the frequency and severity of 
losses, thus assuming more risk than 
anticipated. Also, excess and um­
brella coverage may not always be 
available because underwriters may 
be reluctant to provide excess cover­
age to self-insured companies.
Captive Insurance Companies. 
Congress passed the Product Liabil­
ity Risk Retention Act of 1981 in 
response to the decrease in available 
product liability coverage that oc­
curred during the late 1970s. The act 
allowed product manufacturers to 
form risk retention groups. Risk re­
tention groups, or captive insurance 
companies, are entities that provide 
liability coverage for companies in a 
given business or with similar risks. 
The act allowed the groups to form 
offshore entities (for example, in Ber­
muda) and sell product liability cov­
erage onshore if they met one state’s 
capitalization requirement. The cap­
tive insurance company was to be 
regulated by the state in which it 
was chartered [Riley, p. 62, 1986].
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Businesses today are 
absorbing and 
financing more risks 
than ever before 




The Risk Retention Act of 1986 
expanded the 1981 act to include 
commercial liability coverage. Com­
panies in the same business or with 
similar risks can form an insurance 
company to provide themselves with 
commercial liability coverage. The 
insurance company must be licensed 
under the laws of at least one state 
and provide coverage for its mem­
bers only. Risk retention groups are 
not subject to certain Securities and 
Exchange Commission requirements 
and other regulations in solicitation 
of funds for capital and surplus. 
Groups operating out of state are not 
subject to guaranty fund assessments 
or assigned risk pools. Therefore, 
they are not eligible for state insur­
ance insolvency funds which pay 
claims if an insurer folds [Hackavy, 
1987].
Risk Management. Because of 
the retention of more risk than ever 
before, many companies are placing 
an emphasis on risk management. In 
the past, risk management consisted 
of buying insurance to cover the risk 
of loss and implementing an em­
ployee safety program to reduce 
internal claims. Today, a risk man­
agement program must involve 
much more than that. It must iden­
tify the risks throughout the organiza­
tion, recommend ways to eliminate 
or reduce the risks, and determine 
ways to finance the losses from risks 
that cannot be eliminated. In these 
times of high cost and limited or 
unavailable coverage, many compa­
nies are making risk management a 
major concern. According to an arti­
cle in Risk Management, “the design 
of an insurance/self-insurance pro­
gram has important cost implica­
tions in risk, cash flow, taxation, cost 
stability, and profits, to name but a 
few areas” [Best-Devereux, p. 32, 
1985].
Relevant Pronouncements
Concepts relevant to the disclosure 
of self-insurance are found in cur­
rent accounting pronouncements and 
other references, even though none 
of these sources explicitly requires 
disclosure. FASB Statement of Finan­
cial Accounting Standards (FASB) 
No. 5 requires disclosure of a loss 
contingency that is reasonably pos­
sible or a loss that is probable but for 
which no estimate can be deter­
mined. It does not require disclosure 
of uninsured risks “[b]ecause of the 
problems involved in developing op­
erational criteria for disclosure” 
[AICPA, p. 4, 1986]. Those problems 
still exist, but today’s insurance en­
vironment has increased the risks 
for uninsured or underinsured com­
panies.
The objective of financial report­
ing, according to FASB Concept 
Statement No. 1, is to provide users 
with information that will help them 
to assess the amounts, timing and 
uncertainties of a firm’s future cash 
inflows. Information about factors 
affecting a firm’s liquidity or sol­
vency, as well as disclosure of signif­
icant uncertainties, should be pro­
vided [Task Force, p. 14, 1986].
The Securities and Exchange Com­
mission (SEC) requires that uncer­
tainties that materially affect a 
firm’s liquidity, capital resources 
and/or results of operations, “or that 
are reasonably expected to material­
ly affect income from continuing 
operations” be disclosed [Hackavy, 
p. 9, 1987]. Firms registering for 
initial public offerings are required 
to provide information about the 
high-risk factors of the current or 
proposed business. These require­
ments exceed the requirements of 
generally accepted accounting prin­
ciples applicable to the usual finan­
cial statements [AICPA, pp. 15-16, 
1986].
AcSEC recently issued a State­
ment of Position, Accounting for 
Asserted and Unasserted Medical 
Malpractice Claims of Health Care 
Providers and Related Issues. 
AcSEC’s position is that a health 
care provider’s malpractice cover­
age is significant to an understand­
ing of its financial statements. Thus, 
the statement requires that unin­
sured asserted and unasserted med­
ical malpractice claims that cannot 
be estimated be disclosed as a con­
tingency as required by FASB 
Statement No. 5 [AICPA, SOP, pp.
8-9, 1983; Holley, p. 58, 1985].
Due to the concern about insurance 
coverage, early in 1986 AcSEC estab­
lished a Task Force on Disclosure of 
Insurance. In the issues paper pre­
sented at the October 2, 1986, meet­
ing of the AcSEC, the Task Force 
concluded that “if a reporting entity 
is exposed to risks of loss relating to 
torts; theft of, damage to, expropria­
tion of, or destruction of assets; busi­
ness interruption; errors or omis­
sions; injuries to employees; or acts 
of God, but has not transferred such 
risks to which it is exposed to un­
related third parties through insur­
ance, disclosure of such circum­
stances should be required” [AICPA, 
p. 19, 1986].
The Task Force also considered 
the issue of whether to require dis­
closure “only when it is at least rea­
sonably possible that (a) the risk 
could result in an event that is mate­
rial as defined in FASB Concepts 
Statement No. 2, or (b) the risk could 
result in an event that could have a 
severe impact on an entity’s future 
cash flows or results of operation.”
Severe Impact is defined as one 
that is disruptive to a business enter­
prise. Disruptions include, for exam­
ple, substantial disposition of assets, 
restructuring of debt, forced revi­
sions or curtailment of operations, or 
major changes in the reporting enti­
ty’s revenue or cost structure. A 
severe impact does not necessarily 
threaten an enterprise’s continued 
existence, but it may. The concept of 
severe impact differs from the con­
cept of materiality in that matters 
that may be important enough to 
influence a user’s decision (and are 
therefore material), may not be so 
significant as to disrupt an enter­
prise. For example, some items are 
material to an investor because they 
might affect the price of the enter­
prise’s stock (such as a modest de­
cline in net income), but they would
Companies in the 
same business or with 
similar risks can 
form an insurance 
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not necessarily have a severe impact 
on the enterprise itself [AICPA, p. 
23, 1986].
Six of the Task Force members 
believed that disclosure should be 
required “only when it is at least rea­
sonably possible that the risk could 
result in an event that could have a 
severe impact on an entity’s future 
cash flows or results of operations” 
[AICPA, p. 25, 1986]. They did not 
consider it necessary to disclose risks 
“only when it is, at least reasonably 
possible that the risk could result in 
an event that is material as defined 
in FASB Concepts Statement No. 2” 
[AICPA, p. 26, 1986].
The final Task Force report ap­
proved by the AcSEC in July 1987 
concluded:
Publicly held entities and enti­
ties with public accountability, 
such as governments, are encour­
aged, but not required, to dis­
close circumstances in which
a.They are exposed to risks of 
future material loss related 
to
i. Torts,
ii. Theft of, damage to, expro­
priation of, or destruction 
of assets,
iii.Business interruption, 
iv.Errors or omissions, 
v.Injuries to employees, or 
vi.Acts of God, and
b.Those risks have not been 
transferred to unrelated 
third parties through insur- 
ance[AICPA, pp. 2-3, 1987].
In essence, AcSEC did not fully sup­
port the conclusions of the task force 
for required disclosures; AcSEC be­
lieved such disclosures would be too 
complex and voluminous to be mean­
ingful to users of financial state­
ments. Moreover, AcSEC expressed 
concern that “required disclosures of 
the kind recommended by the task 
force would involve consideration of 
a multiplicity of factors, none of 
which provides an objective way to 
evaluate risks” [AICPA, p. 5, 1987].
Recommendations
In today’s business environment, 
disclosure of risk management via 
insurance should be required for 
publicly held firms, not just encour­
aged. High premiums, unavailabil­
ity of insurance, and reduced or re­
stricted coverage have forced many 
companies to accept more risks than 
ever before. Increased litigation, the 
expanding scope of liability, and esca­
lating judgments have increased the 
risk that many companies will en­
counter large losses. Moreover, puni­
tive damages may not be covered by 
insurance. Both uninsured or under- 
insured companies may face losses 
that have a severe impact on their 
operations. One of the principal ob­
jectives of accounting, as stated in 
FASB Concepts Statement No. 1, is 
to enable financial statement users 
to assess future cash flows and results 
of operations. If insurance coverage 
is disclosed, users of financial state­
ments could make an assessment of 
the exposure to noninsured risks. 
Risks of loss are important to various 
financial statement users such as 
investors, creditors, regulators, man­
agers and auditors.
The problem with self- 
insurance is that the 
company may 
underestimate the 
frequency and severity 
of losses, thus 
assuming more risk 
than anticipated.
The following disclosures should 
be required of public companies. 
The suggested disclosures are objec­
tively determinable and are not more 
complex or voluminous than many 
other currently required disclosures. 
Consistent with existing reporting 
requirements, these insurance dis­
closures should be required as sup­
plemental information for periods 
covered in the financial statements:
• Insurance premiums paid
• Amount of insurance cover­
age by major risk categories
• Description of coverage, e.g., 
claims-made or occurrence­
based policies
• Amount of claims settled and 
payments made under deduct­
ible provisions
• Amount of recoveries from 
insurance companies or other 
parties
Summary
Insurance can no longer be viewed 
simply as an expense; it has become 
an integral part of corporate finan­
cial strategy. SEC rules require dis­
closure about uncertainties that 
affect a firm’s liquidity, capital re­
sources and/or results of operation. 
FASB Statement of Concepts No. 1 
supports the disclosure of significant 
uncertainties and information about 
factors affecting a firm’s liquidity or 
solvency. FASB Statement No. 5 
requires disclosure of a loss contin­
gency that is reasonably possible or a 
loss that is probable but for which an 
estimate cannot be determined. For 
uninsured or underinsured compa­
nies in today’s business environment, 
loss contingencies due to commercial 
liability are reasonably possible and 
such losses affect liquidity and/or 
results of operations.
The SOP-Medical Malpractice 
Claims issued by the AcSEC of the 
AICPA requires health care provid­
ers to disclose malpractice coverage. 
The need for disclosure of insurance 
for other industries, especially toxic­
waste, chemical, oil, and pharma­
ceutical companies, is just as great 
as it is for health care providers.
For many companies, self-insur­
ance is no longer a matter of choice.
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Consequently, it is desirable to re­
quire specific disclosures in order to 
provide investors with information 
necessary to assess the prospective 
cash flows of a company, as recom­
mended by FASB Statement of Finan­
cial Accounting Concepts No. 1, and 
to meet the general intent and spe­
cific requirements of FASB State­
ment No. 5.
AcSEC revised the 
approach so that 
certain disclosures 
would be “encouraged” 
or recommended but 
not required.
The AICPA Task Force on Disclo­
sure of Insurance recommended that 
certain financial statement disclo­
sures regarding insurance be re­
quired. However, the AcSEC revised 
the approach so that certain disclo­
sures would be “encouraged” or recom-
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mended but not required. This paper 
suggests that the AcSEC approach 
does not go far enough and proposes 
that certain insurance disclosures be 
required of all public companies. 
These disclosures are objectively de­
terminable and should not prove un­
reasonably burdensome since they 
are not more voluminous or complex 
than many currently required dis­
closures. Ω
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